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PRÉCIS: We investigated threat detection performance in cabin baggage screeners at 19 
a major international airport, using their detection of Fictitious Threat Items as the 20 
performance measure. Threat detection was negatively impacted by increased screening shift 21 
length and the number of bags processed per minute (event rate). Performance decrements 22 
emerged within the first 10 minutes of a busy, high event rate shift. The findings suggest 23 
shorter shift rotations would ensure high vigilance in screeners.  24 
 25 
26 
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ABSTRACT 27 
Objective: We aimed to assess the impact of task demands and individual 28 
characteristics on threat detection in baggage screeners. 29 
Background: Airport security staff work under time constraints to ensure optimal 30 
threat detection. Understanding the impact of individual characteristics and task demands on 31 
performance is vital to ensure accurate threat detection.  32 
Method: We examined threat detection in baggage screeners as a function of event 33 
rate (i.e., number of bags per minute) and time on task across 4 months. We measured 34 
performance in terms of the accuracy of detection of Fictitious Threat Items (FTIs) randomly 35 
superimposed on X-ray images of real passenger bags.  36 
Results: Analyses of the percentage of correct FTI identifications (hits) show that 37 
longer shifts with high baggage throughput result in worse threat detection. Importantly, these 38 
significant performance decrements emerge within the first 10 minutes of these busy 39 
screening shifts only.  40 
Conclusion: Longer shift lengths, especially when combined with high baggage 41 
throughput, increase the likelihood that threats go undetected. 42 
Application: Shorter shift rotations, although perhaps difficult to implement during 43 
busy screening periods, would ensure more consistently high vigilance in baggage screeners 44 
and, therefore, optimal threat detection and passenger safety. 45 
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WHEN AND WHY THREATS GO UNDETECTED:  52 
IMPACTS OF EVENT RATE AND SHIFT LENGTH ON THREAT DETECTION 53 
ACCURACY DURING AIRPORT BAGGAGE SCREENING 54 
The smuggling of dangerous materials is a constant threat in our airports, carrying immediate 55 
security risks for travelers and the wider community. This threat is managed by security 56 
personnel who handle a tremendous volume of passenger throughput and work under extreme 57 
pressure, not least because of the risks associated with failing to detect a dangerous item. 58 
Vigilance or sustained attention is central to screeners’ ability to effectively monitor X-rayed 59 
passenger bags for threats that are ill-defined and unpredictable in their occurrence (Warm, 60 
Parasuraman, & Matthews, 2008). Since Mackworth’s (1948, 1950) demonstrations that, over 61 
time, we become less efficient at detecting untoward events (a phenomenon known as the 62 
vigilance decrement), research has focused on tracking the vigilance decrement in laboratory-63 
based vigilance tasks and simulations, often using highly monotonous tasks across extended 64 
time periods (cf. Scerbo, 2001).  65 
A debate persists regarding the underlying mechanism that accounts for the vigilance 66 
decrement (Helton & Warm, 2008; MacLean et al., 2010). Two main competing classes of 67 
theories exist, namely resource (overload) theories and mindlessness (underload) theories. 68 
Resource theory suggests that lapses occur because the need to sustain attention across time 69 
depletes already limited cognitive resources (Helton & Warm, 2008; Matthews, Warm, 70 
Reinerman-Jones, et al., 2010), a contention supported by strong correlations with perceived 71 
mental fatigue (Helton & Warm, 2008; Szalma, Hancock, Dember, & Warm, 2006) and 72 
increased detection errors with increased task difficulty (See, Howe, Warm, & Dember, 73 
1995). Mindlessness theory holds that, when critical events are infrequent and separated by 74 
long time intervals (as occurs in monotonous tasks), observers actively disengage from the 75 
task, resulting in detection errors (Robertson, Manly, Andrade, Baddeley, & Yiend, 1997). 76 
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They become bored, as indicated by an increase in task unrelated thoughts (Smallwood et al., 77 
2004). Unrelated cues could mitigate against this by inducing a more mindful mode (Cheyne, 78 
Solman, Carriere, & Smilek, 2009; Dockree et al., 2004; but see Helton & Russell, 2011; 79 
Helton & Russell, 2012; Manly et al., 2004).  80 
Although some recent laboratory-based studies favor resource theory as the 81 
explanation for the vigilance decrement (Helton & Russell, 2011, 2012), the debate is as yet 82 
unresolved (Warm, Finomore, Vidulich, & Funke, 2015; see also Thomson, Besner, & 83 
Smilek, 2015). Whether the decrement occurs similarly in workplace settings is also a subject 84 
of ongoing debate (e.g., Hancock, 2014; Mackie, 1987; Parasuraman & Giambra, 1991; 85 
Parasuraman, Warm, & Dember, 1987; Pigeau, Angus, O'Neill, & Mack, 1995). Airports 86 
internationally have endeavored to combat the potential mindlessness of baggage screening 87 
through the implementation of Threat Image Projection (TIP) technology. This technology 88 
embeds Fictitious Threat Images (FTIs) in X-ray images of some bags at random intervals 89 
and provides performance feedback (Hancock & Hart, 2002). This serves the purpose of 90 
increasing the proportion of bags with salient items (capable of capturing attention) which 91 
may reduce the potential for attention to wander, and the knowledge that performance is 92 
monitored using the inserted images (FTIs) may also make screeners more aware of possible 93 
attentional lapses (e.g., Schwaninger, 2003). The task of baggage screening, although 94 
repetitive, does offer ongoing variety: Passenger bags, when scanned, are often visually 95 
complex, and each bag differs from the previous one. The task is also cognitively 96 
challenging: In order to identify the unknown threat (and do so efficiently and accurately), 97 
screeners have to recognize it as a threat item even if it is unusually rotated or partially 98 
occluded and surrounded by other objects.  99 
The length of time across which vigilance must be maintained is a key factor 100 
impacting performance efficiency. Guidelines in place at the airport where the data presented 101 
WHEN AND WHY THREATS GO UNDETECTED 
 
5 
 
herein were collected stipulated a maximum of 20 minutes continuously per screening shift 102 
(Brisbane Airport Corporation, personal communication, 27 June 2006). We wished to 103 
establish whether these guidelines ensured optimal performance. Furthermore, a high 104 
passenger volume together with the demands for optimal vigilance results in a high workload, 105 
more marked at peak travel times (Frederickson & LaPorte, 2002; Seidenstat, 2004). 106 
Although the effects of high workloads on performance in various work environments have 107 
been discussed (e.g., Bezerra & Ribeiro, 2012), to date these have not been quantified for 108 
security screeners in predicting threat detection performance. Screening at busier screening 109 
points with higher passenger volume and concomitantly great baggage throughput may 110 
engender higher stress levels, which could be better tolerated by some (e.g., Cox-Fuenzalida, 111 
Angie, Holloway, & Sohl, 2006; Matthews & Campbell, 2009). 112 
The impact of other factors, such as the threat’s visual characteristics (Smith, 113 
Redford, Washburn, & Taglialatela, 2005), screeners’ prior and on-going training 114 
(Hardmeier, Hofer, & Schwaninger, 2006; Koller, Hardmeier, Michel, & Schwaninger, 2008; 115 
Schwaninger & Hofer, 2004), individual differences in visual ability or knowledge  (Hofer & 116 
Schwaninger, 2005; McCarley, Kramer, Wickens, Vidoni, & Boot, 2004; Smith et al., 2005), 117 
and age and gender characteristics (e.g., Riegelnig & Schwaninger, 2006; Schwaninger, 118 
Hardmeier, Riegelnig, & Martin, 2010), has been described. Regarding gender, Riegelnig and 119 
Schwaninger (2006), for example, found a higher proportion of hits (correct FTI 120 
identifications) for female screeners. Higher FTI hit rates are believed to reflect better 121 
detection rates of real threat items but female screeners also showed higher false alarm rates, 122 
which could be interpreted as a leniency in  responding to avoid the risk of passing a 123 
dangerous item undetected through the screening process. 124 
Screeners typically range in age from young adult to late middle age or older. Age-125 
related cognitive slowing occurs in various cognitive abilities essential in baggage screening, 126 
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such as vigilance or sustained attention and working memory (Salthouse, 2003), but not 127 
procedural and semantic memory (Craik & Bosman, 1992). Some aspects of perception are 128 
negatively impacted also, including mental rotation (Morrow & Schriver, 2007). Indeed, 129 
Morrow and Schriver (2007) showed better performance in males overall, a difference that 130 
tended to persist with age. Schwaninger et al. (2010) demonstrated that older adults with 131 
many years of job-specific screening experience nonetheless showed a marked performance 132 
decline. 133 
We asked whether the progressive performance decrement across time seen in the 134 
laboratory occurs similarly in baggage screening, a real-world vigilance task that is 135 
characterized by safety-critical decisions frequently made under high pressure to ensure both 136 
passenger safety and optimal passenger throughput. We did so by analyzing screener 137 
performance data, collected at passenger screening points as part of a standard performance 138 
efficiency tracking and training protocol at a major Australian international airport. We 139 
wished to determine the impact of age, gender, work status (full-time, part-time, or casual), 140 
time on task (shift length), and event rate (measured as number of bags per minute) on 141 
screeners’ performance. All these aspects are important to quantify because, to ensure 142 
screeners can maintain optimal vigilance, clear empirical data are required on the optimal 143 
workloads and shift lengths. Because our data were obtained by the airport and not in 144 
controlled laboratory conditions, shift lengths varied, as did the number of shifts each 145 
individual screener experienced in the 4 months we analyzed. Such performance data provide 146 
a rich source of information on actual screener performance in the workplace. 147 
 148 
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METHODS 149 
Participants 150 
During the 4-month data collection period, 170 security screeners worked on the 151 
cabin baggage X-ray screening machines at an Australian international airport. Because the 152 
accuracies across the sample were generally very high (see below), data were analysed only 153 
for those who experienced at least 30 FTIs across this period (N=123) to enable sufficient 154 
presentations to observe misses. Employee records were interrogated on our behalf to obtain 155 
age, gender, and work status (full-time, part-time, or casual) for each participant. Table 1 156 
shows the screeners’ demographic characteristics. Part-time screeners were on an ongoing 157 
employment contract but on a part-time basis. Casual screeners were hired on a short-term 158 
basis only. 159 
 160 
TABLE 1: Demographic Characteristics of the Security Screeners (N= 123) for the 4-Month 161 
Period.  162 
 163 
Demographic Characteristic  Mean Standard Deviation  
Age  38 12.20 
Gender (%)   
Female  62  
Male  38  
Work Status (%)   
Full-time  10  
Part-time  75  
Casual  15  
 164 
 165 
Materials and Procedure 166 
The data examined herein were acquired using TIP technology (see also Hofer & 167 
Schwaninger, 2004, 2005; Schwaninger, 2003). The airport used TIP technology to monitor 168 
threat detection performance as follows. During screening, the software randomly embedded 169 
FTIs in X-ray images of some bags at a rate of one FTI per 25 bags on average and, 170 
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occasionally, also presented a fictitious image of an entire bag containing an FTI (≤ 25% of 171 
all projected images). A minimum of 2 FTIs were projected in a 20 minute period; shorter 172 
shifts did not always contain FTIs. FTIs were randomly sourced from the TIP image library. 173 
In all, 950 individual images were presented (featuring bombs 30%, knives 32%, and guns 174 
37% in different orientations). The screeners knew that FTIs could occur and that their FTI 175 
detection performance was recorded to measure their efficiency. They pressed a marked 176 
console button only if they believed an FTI was present. A correct FTI detection within a 177 
prescribed time period (5s) constituted a hit. If the FTI was embedded in a real bag or the 178 
screener indicated incorrectly that an FTI was present, they re-screened the bag. On-screen 179 
feedback was provided about correct FTI detections, misses, and incorrect identifications. On 180 
completion of each shift, feedback about their overall performance accuracy (based solely on 181 
FTI detection) was also provided. Dense areas in the display were marked to make it easier 182 
for screeners to zoom into them. If the screener believed a real threat was present, a security 183 
protocol was triggered to identify the threat. For each screening shift, the recorded data 184 
included (1) the identity of the FTIs, (2) whether they were correctly identified, (3) time to 185 
identification, (4) shift length, (5) screeners’ identification numbers, and (6) the event rate for 186 
the shift. We examined 36,920 FTI presentations across 4 months (archival airport data), 187 
sampling across 13,787 screening shifts across several screening points. For a subset of shifts 188 
(N = 5,094 shifts comprising 20,245 FTIs, and collected across 123 screeners), there was 189 
sufficient information to determine the number of bags seen per shift. The analyses pertaining 190 
to these shifts are reported here. Log-on and log-off times, recorded for each shift, were used 191 
to establish shift length. Performance was assessed as a function of the length of time 192 
screeners were stationed at the X-ray screen before the first FTI appeared and the event rate 193 
during the session. We considered performance in terms of the percentage of correct 194 
detections (measured as accuracy) and response time (the time taken to signal that an FTI was 195 
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detected). Because of technology limitations at the airport, false alarms could not be 196 
accurately measured. Specifically, it was not possible to verify whether a true threat may 197 
have existed in any of the physical bags. A positive response in the absence of FTI may either 198 
have been a false alarm or a real threat not captured by the system. A positive response to an 199 
inserted image (indexed as a hit), however, is not in question, as this is a measurable response 200 
to a verified image. For this reason, we focused our analysis on hits. 201 
Data Analysis 202 
To examine the effects of age, gender, and work status on accuracy and response time 203 
(RT), parametric and non-parametric between-groups analyses and correlation analyses were 204 
performed. Both accuracy and RT were highly skewed because of general high levels of 205 
performance and were therefore analysed non-parametrically. Because the standards for 206 
performance of the TIP training require that the participant consult the display for no longer 207 
than 5 seconds, only trials less than or equal to 5 seconds in duration were analysed. To 208 
examine the effects of event rate and time on task, we employed Generalized Estimating 209 
Equations (GEE), with each individual trial as a case and screener identity as a random 210 
factor. Such an analysis permits modelling of continuous covariates (here event rate and time 211 
on task) without the need to group and average responses, therefore improving sensitivity and 212 
allowing better modelling of the effects. Additionally, GEE permit unbalanced designs, and 213 
therefore do not require all participants to have had similar shifts. As recommended 214 
(Ballinger, 2004), models were compared using several covariance structures (independent, 215 
autogressive, and exchangeable) and the model providing the best fit (according to the Quasi 216 
Akaike Information Criterion) was interpreted. 217 
 218 
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RESULTS 219 
Overall accuracy 220 
Overall, there was considerable variation in overall accuracy (of all FTI presentations; 221 
percentage of correctly identified FTIs). The mean accuracy was 93.5% (SD = 4.27%). 222 
However, accuracies for some screeners were low, between 80 - 90% (N = 17); one screener 223 
had only a 71% accuracy. 224 
Relationships between overall accuracy and the screeners’ age and gender were 225 
examined using non-parametric tests to account for the skewness of the distribution. A 226 
Spearman rank-order correlation revealed no significant association between age and the 227 
overall accuracy (ρ = -.026, p = .711). Men (M = 93.53%), and women (M = 93.22%) did not 228 
differ in terms of their accuracy overall (Wilcoxon rank-sum test W = 4627, p = .658). Full-229 
time (M = 93.6%), part-time (M = 93.4%) and casual employees (M = 93%) also appeared 230 
equally accurate overall (Kruskal-Wallis χ 2 (2) = .352, p = .839). See Table 2 for a summary 231 
of the data. 232 
Relationships of response time and accuracy 233 
Mean RTs showed considerably less variation in overall performance. With invalid 234 
trials (those > 5 sec in duration) removed and all trials averaged for each screener, no 235 
screener had a trimmed mean RT greater than 2s (mean RT = 1.18s, SD = .22). Overall 236 
accuracy correlated with RT (Spearman’s ρ = -.295, p = .001). On average slower screeners 237 
were less accurate than faster screeners. 238 
239 
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 240 
TABLE 2: Mean ± Standard Deviation accuracy (percent correct detection) and RT 241 
(seconds) as a function of gender and work status 242 
 243 
    Accuracy RT 
Gender Female 93.53 ± 4.87% 1.14 ± 0.23 
Male 93.22 ± 5.11% 1.21 ± 0.22 
Work Status Casual 92.99 ± 5.31% 1.27 ±  0.23 
Full-time 93.60 ± 3.43% 1.14 ± 0.16 
  Part-time 93.38 ± 5.15% 1.17 ± 0.23 
 244 
  245 
Effects of shift length and event rate 246 
The accuracy of identification for each FTI was examined using a two-way 247 
Generalised Estimating Equation with the time from log-on to the present FTI presentation 248 
(time to the FTI in question), and event rate during the session as factors, screener as a 249 
random variable, and accuracy as the criterion. There was no significant main effect of time-250 
to-FTI, 2(1) = 2.488, p = .115. However, there was a significant event rate main effect, 2(1) 251 
= 4.999, p= .025, and a significant event rate x time-to-FTI interaction, 2(1) = 4.715, p = 252 
.030 (see Figure 1). To visualize the continuous interaction, Figure 1 was constructed by 253 
splitting all trials into those occurring early (below the median of 8.33 min) and late in the 254 
shift (above the median), and those which occurred within a shift characterized by high 255 
(above the median of 5.4 bags per minute) or low event rate (below the median). As Figure 1 256 
shows, when the number of bags seen was high, performance greatly deteriorated as the shift 257 
continued. By contrast, when the number of bags was low, the performance decrement was 258 
markedly less. 259 
************************************************************** 260 
[Insert Figure 1 about here – Figure heading below] 261 
*************************************************************** 262 
WHEN AND WHY THREATS GO UNDETECTED 
 
12 
 
Figure 1.  Interactive effects on performance accuracy (percent correct) of time at which FTI 263 
appeared on the basis of shift time (early or late; less than or greater than 8.3 minutes) and 264 
event rate (low or high; less than or greater than 5.4 bags per minute during the shift). 265 
To follow up the performance deterioration which apparently occurred selectively in 266 
sessions characterised by high event rate, an analysis was conducted to examine the effect on 267 
accuracy of time-to-FTI only for shifts characterised by a high event rate (above the median), 268 
and for shifts shorter than 30 minutes (to remove the possible influence of a few cases 269 
exceeding 30 minutes). To examine whether performance declined at a steady rate or 270 
exponentially over time, three effects were compared in the same GEE: (1) a linear term, 271 
representing the time between the start of a shift (log-on) and the FTI, (2) a quadratic term, 272 
calculated as the square of the time between log-on and the FTI, and (3) a cubic term, 273 
calculated as the cube of the time between log-on and the FTI. A stepwise analysis, removing 274 
each non-significant term until only significant terms remained, revealed a non-significant 275 
linear component, 2(1) = 1.610, p = .205, and a non-significant cubic term, 2(1) = 1.608, p 276 
= .205. The quadratic component alone remained significant, 2(1) = 12.998, p < .001.Figure 277 
2 shows the exponential effect of increasing time between log-on and FTI presentation on 278 
accuracy. There is a pronounced curvilinearity such that, initially, performance declines only 279 
slightly from the very first trials for perhaps the first third of the shift, and then begins to 280 
decline at an increasing rate. Notably, performance begins to drop as early as 10 minutes into 281 
the shift, and drops rapidly after this time. 282 
*************************************************************** 283 
[Insert Figure 2 about here – Figure heading below] 284 
***************************************************************** 285 
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Figure 2. Fitted quadatric trend for the GEE model for accuracy (percent correct) as a 286 
function of time on task for high workload shifts. Performance declined exponentially with 287 
increasing time on task 288 
.DISCUSSION 289 
 The present study demonstrates that, for baggage screeners at X-ray checkpoints, 290 
shifts which were characterized by greater busyness (i.e., a greater number of bags seen per 291 
minute) were associated with a reduction in performance over time, and that during busy 292 
periods such performance decrement could be observed as early as 10 minutes into a shift. 293 
This pattern suggests that shift times for X-ray baggage screeners may need to be rotated 294 
faster under high passenger throughput conditions to reduce fatigue effects and attentional 295 
lapses. Our data suggest a strong cumulative effect of the number of bags screened, such that 296 
screeners can maintain vigilance over longer periods when fewer bags go through per minute 297 
(low event rate); however, performance declines more quickly when the event rate is high.  298 
This variable performance pattern, dependent on baggage throughput, suggests that 299 
the screeners’ workload is the primary determinant of lapses of attention at baggage 300 
screening points. Importantly, as the data show (see Figure 1), the drop in performance is 301 
only noticeable under conditions of high workload. This effect of higher workload - caused 302 
by an increased number of bags needing to be thoroughly checked faster – is consistent with 303 
increased task demand producing mental fatigue and resulting in the early vigilance 304 
decrement. The pattern of results we observed therefore further supports the argument that, 305 
consistent with numerous laboratory-based findings (e.g., Szalma et al., 2004; Warm et al., 306 
2008), the resource demand associated with the screening task (especially acute at busy 307 
times) accounts for the vigilance decrement (see also Helton & Russell, 2011; 2012; 2015). 308 
Importantly, we observed this pattern in performance data obtained in a real world screening 309 
environment. The early appearance of the vigilance decrement when the event rate is high is 310 
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less easily reconciled with an underload account, specifically why the decrement occurs only 311 
in higher workload settings. Not only is the screening task less monotonous through the use 312 
of FTIs (Hancock & Hart, 2002), it is unlikely that screeners are habituated or bored so early 313 
into the task.  It is worth noting that, in this study, workload was operationalized as the total 314 
number of bags screened in the work session.  It may be informative in future studies to 315 
examine in finer detail whether performance at different times during a session (e.g., the most 316 
busy moment compared to the least busy moment within a session) showed similar changes.  317 
Our data did not allow for such an analysis, however they did clearly show that it was during 318 
busier shifts that performance decrements over time were observable. 319 
Airport security staff generally perform at a high level, as is also reflected in our data. 320 
However, even small declines in accuracy (indeed, a single missed threat) could be 321 
catastrophic if the attentional lapse occurred when a dangerous item was smuggled through. 322 
Our data suggest that increases in either passenger throughput, or fatigue beyond the limits 323 
we observed, could be associated with significant reductions in performance if the trends 324 
continued. A combination of higher workload and longer shifts would likely increase 325 
operator stress, thus increasing the negative impact on performance. This prediction is 326 
consistent with the finding that a visual vigilance task performance was negatively affected 327 
by increased workload and length of the task (Szalma et al., 2004) and with reports of 328 
feelings of stress and mental fatigue after carrying out a vigilance task (Szalma et al., 2006). 329 
There were large individual differences in performance accuracy, with a few 330 
individuals contributing a considerable number of errors. Overall, those with higher error 331 
rates were also generally slower to respond. This finding is consistent with previous research 332 
indicating that individual differences may be the primary determinant of performance on 333 
these baggage screening tasks (Hardmeier et al., 2006; Schwaninger, Hardmeier, & Hofer, 334 
2005). Such a pattern might be symptomatic of either a lack of confidence or a lack of ability 335 
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in the task and as such, slow responders, as well as those with abnormally low accuracies 336 
should be carefully screened to ensure their competence to carry out screening duties. It is 337 
worth exploring whether the deleterious effects of work load shown here interact with other 338 
personality dimensions, such that individuals with inherently lower ability may be more 339 
distractible or fatigue more quickly than more able individuals (see also Szalma, 2009).  340 
No overall gender differences were found in relation to the accuracy of FTI 341 
identifications. This broad accuracy measure also showed no effects of age or work status 342 
(for example, see Matthews, Warm, Shaw, & Finomore, 2010; Reinerman-Jones, Matthews, 343 
Langheim, & Warm, 2011). It is conceivable that differences do obtain when false alarm data 344 
can be considered. Because the TIP program coded false alarms exclusively in relation to 345 
incorrect FTI identification and no data were available to verify that a false alarm was not, at 346 
the same time, linked with the correct identification of an actual threat or a screener’s 347 
signaled suspicion that a threat might be present, we are not in a position to address this issue 348 
conclusively. Future research of on-site baggage screening should attempt to collect 349 
contemporaneous data relating to actual threat detection and baggage re-check occurrences. 350 
Here we examined accuracy solely as a function of workload (conceptualized as the 351 
number of bags screened per minute) but other factors in the screening environment could 352 
also significantly impact performance. For example, the predominantly speech-based 353 
background noise (some directly relevant to their task) could be distracting (Szalma & 354 
Hancock, 2011), and screeners are also sometimes distracted by passengers and other staff. 355 
Some authors have suggested that auditory distraction can affect performance of a visual task 356 
(e.g., Jones, 1995; Schaefer, Tewes, Münte, & Johannes, 2006; but see also Guerreiro & van 357 
Gerven, 2011). Perceived stress can also impact negatively (e.g., Hancock & Warm, 2003) 358 
but it is largely unknown how performance is impacted by the combination of background 359 
noise and the perceived pressure not to miss any real or fictitious threats.  360 
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FUTURE DIRECTIONS 361 
 Our data consisted only of performance on FTIs, shift lengths, age, gender, and work 362 
status of screeners. Several variables were unknown and, had they been available, would have 363 
allowed further exploration of the data. For example, how much training individuals received 364 
to prepare them for their screening responsibilities was unknown, and neither did we know 365 
whether screeners (especially those with poor performance) received additional training 366 
during the 4-month period we analysed. Such data, when combined with FTI detection, 367 
would yield a more comprehensive picture of performance.  368 
Much research has focused on selection criteria for security positions (e.g., Hofer, 369 
Hardmeier, & Schwaninger, 2006; see also Matthews et al., 2010; Reinerman-Jones et al., 370 
2011) with the express objective to establish those individual characteristics that make for the 371 
ideal screening operator, however much of this research has been confined to laboratory-372 
based studies. Given the variable screening environment (characterised by difference in 373 
busyness at screening points) and the impact of individual characteristics (such as 374 
extraversion/introversion) on one’s ability to perform vigilance tasks (Cox-Fuenzalida et al., 375 
2006), it would be valuable to determine if the impact of these individual characteristics 376 
generalizes to real world security screening settings such as the operational settings that 377 
generated our data. 378 
Importantly, our data showed a marked and clear negative impact on screening 379 
performance the busier the shift, and a measurable decline in performance accuracy that not 380 
only starts early (within 10 min) but accelerates with time. Operational changes (such as 381 
shorter shift lengths and paced baggage processing) could mitigate against this performance 382 
decline and the associated performance data would provide a valuable source for further 383 
investigation. As noted above, it was not possible in this study to distinguish between false 384 
alarms and real threat items correctly identified in passengers’ bags. It would be valuable to 385 
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be able to link FTI performance data with more detailed information (obtained online and on 386 
site) regarding the nature of the false alarms. In so doing, more detailed performance analyses 387 
would allow further exploration of the nature of the performance decrement in the screening 388 
setting, in particular of the impact of overload on the allocation of attentional resources and 389 
strategic behavior. 390 
 391 
SUMMARY AND IMPACT ON INDUSTRY 392 
Shift times for baggage screeners should be computed as a function of the workload 393 
screeners face at any given time, rather than remaining fixed at recommended time limits. 394 
Moreover, shift lengths should be flexible enough to enable screeners to rotate faster as 395 
demand at a particular screening point increases. Doing so is likely to ensure high and stable 396 
performance across shifts. It is worth investigating whether the same patterns occur in other 397 
security settings where time on task and workload both vary according to situational factors. 398 
Airports should weigh up the need to ensure fast passenger throughput to meet departure 399 
schedules against the increased risk of employing poorly trained or less experienced 400 
screeners. The performance patterns we tracked provide further support for targeted 401 
personnel selection and training as some of the key measures required to safeguard airport 402 
security.  403 
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SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL 412 
The data were obtained from the Brisbane Airport Corporation (BAC) by special request and 413 
access is privileged. 414 
 415 
KEY POINTS 416 
 We examined threat detection performance in baggage screeners as a function of shift 417 
length and event rate (number of bags per minute). 418 
 Performance was measured in terms of the accuracy of the detection of Fictitious 419 
Threat Items (FTI). 420 
 Our analyses of real-world screening data reveals poorer threat detection on longer 421 
shifts with a higher workload (i.e., greater bag throughput) occurring as early as 10 422 
minutes into the session 423 
 Optimal threat detection (and therefore passenger safety) requires shorter shift 424 
rotations, especially at busy times. 425 
426 
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